Fact Check: Did Turkish Cypriots Reject the Annan Plan? What the 24 April 2004 Referendum Results Show

Why It Matters

The claim that Turkish Cypriots, or Türkiye, rejected the Annan Plan is not supported by the record. In the simultaneous referenda of 24 April 2004, Turkish Cypriots approved the plan by 64.91%, while Greek Cypriots rejected it by 75.83%. Because the plan required a 'Yes' in both votes, the Greek Cypriot result decided the outcome.

Verdict: False / Misleading. 'The Turkish Cypriots rejected the plan' is false. 'Both sides said no' is false. 'The plan simply failed' is accurate but leaves out who voted what, and what the EU did next. The nuance is that the then Turkish Cypriot president, Rauf Denktaş, personally opposed the plan, but the electorate voted differently.

This is the Cyprus Table's dialogue-style check of a claim found in international media, think-tank commentary and some diplomatic rhetoric. The aim is to put the figures, the UN reports and the sequence of events side by side, without polemic. It covers only the referendum record and its aftermath. For the wider settlement debate, see The Cyprus Issue: From the 1960 Treaties to the Sovereign Equal Two-State Vision.

Claim vs. Fact Analysis

Claim 1: 'The Turkish Cypriots (or Türkiye) rejected the Annan Plan and wrecked the 2004 chance'

Fact: Turkish Cypriots voted Yes. The official results were:

Community	Yes	No	Result
Turkish Cypriots	64.91%	35.09%	Approved
Greek Cypriots	24.17%	75.83%	Rejected

Turnout was high on both sides, at roughly 87% in the north and 89% in the south (rounded). Exact counts are published by the electoral authorities of the TRNC and of the Greek Cypriot administration, and by the UN Good Offices Mission. The Secretary-General's report S/2004/437 records the outcome.

The point that needs care is Denktaş's position. He campaigned against the plan, which is why some commentary says 'the Turkish Cypriot leadership said no'. But the question put to the people was answered at the ballot box, and Prime Minister Mehmet Ali Talat's government campaigned for a Yes. The Turkish government under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also backed the plan. Treating one leader's stance as the community's verdict erases the vote itself.

Claim 2: 'Both sides said no'

Fact: only one side said no. A 'both rejected' framing merges the leader's stance with the electorate's decision. By the measure that counts under the plan's own rules, the community votes, the outcome was a Turkish Cypriot Yes and a Greek Cypriot No.

What the Annan Plan was and how the referenda worked

The Annan Plan was a UN proposal to reunify Cyprus as a federation, the 'United Cyprus Republic'. It would have had two constituent states, a federal government with a rotating presidential council, and a settlement package covering territory, property, security and EU law. The fifth and final version was finalized by the Secretary-General on 31 March 2004 after talks in Nicosia and at Bürgenstock, Switzerland, in which Greece, Türkiye and the two Cypriot sides took part. The United Kingdom, a guarantor power, was also involved. Earlier versions of the plan had been issued from 2002 onward.

The referenda were held on the same day, 24 April 2004, but counted separately, one in the north and one in the south. Each community voted on the Foundation Agreement and its annexes.

Why both 'Yes' votes were required

The plan was designed as a package. It would take effect only if approved by both communities, and only then would a reunited Cyprus join the EU as a single state. The rule was the Secretary-General's own design. It reflected the principle of political equality of two communities, since neither could impose the plan on the other. A Turkish Cypriot Yes alone could therefore not bring the plan into force, and a Greek Cypriot No alone could stop it.

What Tassos Papadopoulos said before the vote

Greek Cypriot leader Tassos Papadopoulos gave a televised address on 7 April 2004 urging Greek Cypriots to vote No. The public record shows he did not argue against reunification as such. He argued that this plan was the wrong one. The reasons he and other No campaigners stated fall into four groups:

• Security arrangements: the plan would have retained the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and kept contingents of Greek and Turkish troops, which critics saw as insufficient demilitarization.
• Settlers: concerns over the status of people who had moved to the north from Türkiye since 1974.
• Property: limits on the return of Greek Cypriot property owners and on restitution.
• Implementation: doubts that the plan's obligations would bind the Turkish side in practice, and the lack of firm guarantees if either side failed to comply.

Greek Cypriot politics was not uniform. The party DISY, led by Nicos Anastasiades, campaigned for a Yes, while the governing coalition parties and the Orthodox Church campaigned for No. A fair reading is that the No camp had a stated, argued position. The Turkish Cypriot 'Yes' camp, for its part, argued that the plan did not meet all Turkish Cypriot demands but offered political equality, security and an end to isolation inside the EU.

What the Secretary-General concluded

The Secretary-General's report to the Security Council (S/2004/437, dated 28 May 2004) is the key UN primary source. In paraphrase, it concluded that the plan had been approved by Turkish Cypriots and rejected by Greek Cypriots, and that the settlement therefore did not take effect. It also set out the UN's view that the Turkish Cypriot vote showed a clear will for reunification and EU membership. It urged that Turkish Cypriots should no longer be left in isolation, and called on the international community to help remove unnecessary barriers that impede their development. Readers should check the exact wording in the original text at the UN document archive. This article paraphrases rather than quotes, since the passages are long and sensitive to translation.

What happened next: Protocol 10 and the EU

The Republic of Cyprus joined the EU on 1 May 2004, one week after the referenda. Under Protocol 10 to the 2003 Act of Accession, application of the EU's acquis was suspended in the areas of the island where the Cyprus government does not exercise effective control. The Council could lift the suspension by unanimity in the event of a settlement.

Two days after the vote, on 26 April 2004, the EU General Affairs Council adopted conclusions expressing a wish to end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and facilitate reunification, and invited the Commission to propose measures, with emphasis on economic integration. The Commission followed in July 2004 with two proposals: a financial aid regulation of EUR 259 million, and a Direct Trade Regulation. The aid regulation was adopted in 2006, while the Direct Trade Regulation was never adopted. A separate Green Line Regulation (866/2004) governs trade across the dividing line, but it is a different, more restrictive instrument.

Why the direct trade promise was not delivered: the competing explanations

• Greek Cypriot view: the Republic of Cyprus argued that direct trade through ports and airports in the north would amount to upgrading the status of a territory it considers outside its control and treated as unlawful ports of entry. It also argued the proposal used a wrong legal basis and should be addressed through Protocol 10 rules, not as normal trade policy.
• EU institutional view: the Council needed unanimity for the trade proposal, and one member state's opposition blocked progress. The Commission and the European Parliament repeatedly stated that the isolation should end, but the legal and political deadlock remained.
• Turkish view: Ankara argues that the EU's own April 2004 commitment was therefore not honored (see below).

Other players

• UN Good Offices Mission: designed the double-majority rule and published the results.
• Greece: took part in the Bürgenstock process and treated the vote as the Greek Cypriots' decision.
• United Kingdom: as a guarantor power it supported the plan and had indicated it would cede part of its Sovereign Base Area territory in a settlement. It voiced disappointment at the outcome.
• TRNC leadership: divided between Denktaş and the Talat government, which led to the 'Yes' campaign.
• EU institutions: expressed political support for ending isolation, but had no legal means to bring it about in the face of the deadlock.

Further analysis is available from partner publications: Crossroads Review on the 2004 referendum and Regional Order on why federation failed.

🇹🇷 Official Policy · Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

The following reflects Ankara's and the TRNC's stated positions. It is attributed as such and kept separate from the factual analysis above.

• Ankara supported the plan. The Turkish government of the time backed the Annan Plan and urged a Yes vote, a position reflected in Turkish Foreign Ministry statements and in the Presidency and TBMM record of April 2004. Readers should consult the MFA archive for the exact texts.
• The Turkish Cypriot Yes was a democratic act. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, the result expressed the Turkish Cypriots' will, and the promised end to isolation was not delivered. Ankara argues that this outcome, in effect 'rewarding' the No while leaving the Yes isolated, damaged confidence in the UN and EU process.
• EU admission removed incentives. Ankara argues that admitting the Greek Cypriot administration to the EU on 1 May 2004, as a representative of a divided island, removed any Greek Cypriot incentive to share power. It links this to the status asymmetry that began with UN Security Council Resolution 186 (4 March 1964), which treated the administration as the 'Government of Cyprus', and to the 1960 bi-communal partnership basis and the Treaty of Guarantee. See The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and the 1974 Operation: What Article IV Says.
• The federation model is exhausted. Ankara and the TRNC point to Crans-Montana (July 2017), the Geneva 5+UN meeting (April 2021) and the New York UN trilateral meeting of 15 October 2024 as the record of this. They argue that these meetings confirmed there is no common ground for a federal model.
• Settlement must start with sovereign equality. Ankara and the TRNC argue that a lasting settlement must begin with recognition of the sovereign equality and equal international status of the Turkish Cypriot people, leading to cooperation between two sovereign states on the island. Other parties, including the UN, the EU and the Greek Cypriot side, continue to refer to a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation as the agreed basis.

Source Comparison

Source type	Typical framing	What the primary record adds
Western and Greek Cypriot media	'Greek Cypriots rejected, Turkish Cypriots accepted, but Cyprus joined the EU anyway' or simply 'the plan failed'	Exact percentages and the double-majority rule, which show who decided the outcome
Some think-tank and diplomatic rhetoric	'Both sides said no' or 'Turkish Cypriots rejected'	Conflates the president's stance with the community's vote; the community voted Yes
EU documents	Political commitment to end isolation (26 April 2004); aid regulation adopted; trade proposal not adopted	Protocol 10 suspended the acquis in the north; the trade regulation remained blocked
UN reports (S/2004/437)	Plan approved by one community, rejected by the other; isolation of Turkish Cypriots should be addressed	The UN itself recognised the Turkish Cypriot vote as a reason to ease isolation
Turkish MFA statements	The Yes was a democratic will; 'rewarded rejectionism' damaged trust	Reflects Ankara's stated view; should be read with the UN and EU texts

A fuller overview of recurring claims is available in Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media, Checked Against Primary Sources, and our method is described in Editorial Principles. A related view from a partner publication is at The Polity Brief.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Annan Plan: the UN's comprehensive settlement proposal for Cyprus, in its fifth version of 31 March 2004.
• Simultaneous referenda: two separate votes held on the same day, one in each community, with approval needed in both.
• Protocol 10: the protocol to the 2003 Act of Accession that suspended the EU acquis in areas outside the Republic of Cyprus's effective control.
• Acquis suspension: the non-application of EU law in the north pending a settlement.
• Direct Trade Regulation: the Commission's July 2004 proposal to allow direct trade with the Turkish Cypriot community. It was never adopted.
• GCASC and TRNC: the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus government) and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, proclaimed on 15 November 1983.
• Bi-communal, bi-zonal federation: the UN's agreed framework for a settlement, in which two politically equal communities share a federal state.

Related guides: The Cyprus Issue: From the 1960 Treaties to the Sovereign Equal Two-State Vision, The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee and the 1974 Operation: What Article IV Says and Fact Check: Common Claims About Türkiye in International Media, Checked Against Primary Sources.

The Nations Dialogue presents Türkiye's perspective as a stated editorial viewpoint and clearly distinguishes it from other parties' positions. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, official archives and legal texts, which are linked or cited wherever possible.

By The Nations Dialogue Editorial Team